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WORKING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FENCE: RELIEF
FOR INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS AFTER
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

ABSTRACT
One of America’s largest workforces, comprised of 1.5 million
incarcerated workers, remains unprotected by employment discrimination statutes and vulnerable to abuse from a system designed to
exploit their labor. This Note highlights the effects of the lack of
protection against employment discrimination for incarcerated
workers. This Note will analyze the circuit split regarding the
application of employment discrimination statutes to prisoners
based on varying understandings of the term “employee” and explain why both approaches fail incarcerated workers. Although one
approach bars suit from incarcerated employees altogether, the
other only allows suit when the incarcerated individual is working
in an “optional” job opportunity. This Note will demonstrate that the
distinction between forced and optional labor made by the circuit
split is untenable today. Further, regardless of what test determines
“employee” status, this Note proposes courts should find incarcerated workers to be employees and thus covered under employment
discrimination statutes. All workers deserve to be, and should be,
protected by the courts from discrimination in the workplace regardless of their incarceration status. To recognize the employee status
of incarcerated workers would be to fulfill the purpose of the statutes by protecting vulnerable workers and creating a safer work
environment.
INTRODUCTION
I. OVERVIEW OF PRISON LABOR
A. Early History of Prison Labor in the United States
B. Post–Civil War Prison Labor and the Thirteenth
Amendment
C. The Use of Chain Gangs
D. The Rise of Mass Incarceration
E. From Mass Incarceration to a Mass Labor Force
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE APPLICABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES TO INCARCERATED WORKERS
A. Essential Determination of “Employee” Status
B. Initial Circuit Split on Employee Status
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACHES AND BARRIERS TO
FINDING A SOLUTION
A. Issues with the Williams and Baker Approaches
B. Court-Created Obstacles to Recognizing Incarcerated
Workers’ Rights and Why They Should Not Act as
Barriers
IV. THE SOLUTION: REVISITING THE UNNECESSARY DISTINCTION
BETWEEN FORCED AND OPTIONAL LABOR AND THE STATUS OF
INCARCERATED WORKERS UNDER EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Manhattan Detention Complex detained Anibal
Quinones for a simple parole violation.1 During his detention,
Quinones worked in the kitchen at the facility, where he regularly
spoke Spanish to fellow detainees and officers who oversaw them.2
When the prison assigned a new supervisor to the kitchen, the supervisor made the work environment a “nightmare” and unbearably
“hostile.”3 Despite having no posted policy forbidding inmates from
speaking Spanish, the new supervisor demanded the workers speak
English without regard for the fact that many of them only spoke
Spanish.4 Some inmates were fired, and others quit, because of the
hostile environment created by the supervisor’s aggressive policing
of language in the workplace.5
When Anibal Quinones asked one of the officers to pass him
plastic bags for preparing utensils for meals in Spanish, the supervisor told him to pack his personal belongings and return to his housing unit for the day.6 When Quinones returned to his unit, he filed a
grievance.7 The supervisor quickly retaliated by firing him and
barring him from returning to work at the kitchen.8 Quinones filed a
federal district court action under Title VII, alleging national origin
discrimination and retaliation.9 The district court found that he was
not an employee under Title VII due to his status as a prisoner, and
1.
2020).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Quinones v. N.Y.C., No. 19-CV-05400, 2020 WL 5665142, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17,
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2.
See Quinones, 2020 WL 5665142, at *2.
See id.
See id.
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he was left with no recourse against the prison for the discrimination
and retaliation he endured.10
Anibal Quinones represents just one of the nearly 1.5 million
incarcerated people working for prisons.11 Approximately half of all
inmates in federal and state prisons are required to perform to some
sort of work assignment during their imprisonment.12 The most common prison work involves “prison housework,” including services
such as food service or maintenance.13 Other common assignments
include public work assignments, producing products for the government like license plates, and work in the private sector.14 Not only are
many incarcerated people forced to work as part of their sentences,
they do not enjoy the statutory “protections enjoyed by workers
laboring in the exact same jobs on the other side of the . . . fence.”15
Given the millions of individuals incarcerated in the United
States16 and the importance of anti-discrimination protection in the
workplace, the lack of protections for prison workers poses a significant problem.17 The lack of applicability of employment discrimination
statutes to the prison workplace creates an environment ripe for
abuse of power and discrimination beyond that already inherent in
the prison.18 This has left incarcerated individuals powerless to take
action against the prisons that employ them.19
10. See id. at *7.
11. The last full nationwide census of prisons was in 2005, where it was estimated that
there were nearly 1.5 million incarcerated people working. See Cardiff Garcia & Darius
Rafieyan, The Uncounted Workforce, NPR (June 29, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.npr.org
/transcripts/884989263 [https://perma.cc/PU57-WJFA]. There is currently no central repository of information on prison labor, leaving it up to individual prisons and states to decide
how they choose to count and regulate prison labor. See Quinones, 2020 WL 5665142, at *7.
12. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 57 (2015).
13. Id. (describing the prevalence of different prison work assignments).
14. Id.
15. Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-america/406177
[https://perma.cc/35GA-CG75].
16. As of 2016, 2.3 million people were incarcerated in the United States. How Many
People Are Locked Up in the United States?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prison
policy.org/graphs/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/DUH6-8CHA].
17. The importance of employment discrimination laws is difficult to overstate; antidiscrimination laws create the “means of educating workers about their rights and
responsibilities and provide the means of taking action when violations are noted.” David
Sarokin, The Importance of Employment Laws and Compliance with Intentions of the Laws,
CHRON (Aug. 21, 2020), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/importance-employment-laws
-compliance-intentions-laws-12322.html [https://perma.cc/EP88-24NL]. Additionally,
anti-discrimination laws work to make society overall “more decent and humane by . . .
provid[ing] mechanisms for fair treatment of the . . . workforce.” Id.
18. See Keith Armstrong, Comment, “You May Be Down and Out, But You Ain’t
Beaten”: Collective Bargaining for Incarcerated Workers, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
593, 598 (2020).
19. See id. at 597–99.
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Congress passed three general federal statutes to protect employees from discrimination by employers: Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act (Title VII), the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA),
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).20 Title VII protects
employees from discrimination by employers based on race, color,
national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or religion.21 The ADEA forbids employment discrimination against people aged forty or older.22
Finally, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
a qualified individual on the basis of disability.23
Yet, most courts hold these statutes inapplicable to a massive
group of employees in the United States24: incarcerated individuals.25 This Note will demonstrate that, considering the realities of
prison labor in the twentieth century and the context of the work
performed by incarcerated workers, protections created by employment discrimination statutes should be expanded to cover all labor
required of prisoners.26 Protecting prisoners under these statutes is
necessary to foster a safer work environment and prevent the prison
system from further marginalizing and discriminating against incarcerated people.27
Part I examines the history of prison labor in America and the
importance of employment discrimination protections for incarcerated
individuals in the prison workplace. Part II will discuss the circuit
20. See Timeline of Important EEOC Events, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N:
YOUTH AT WORK, https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/timeline-important-eeoc-events [https://
perma.cc/QBM6-GEM6].
21. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
22. Age Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1967).
23. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990) (amended 2008).
24. See Garcia & Rafieyan, supra note 11 (explaining that “[i]t is hard to know exactly
how big the prison labor industry is” because there has not “been a full nationwide census
of prisons since 2005,” when there were approximately 1.5 million incarcerated individuals
working in prisons).
25. See, e.g., Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
prisoner was not an employee as defined by Title VII or the ADEA because the inmate
does not have an employment relationship with the prison as their relationship is one
of imprisonment); McCaslin v. Cornhusker State Indus., 952 F. Supp. 652, 657 (D. Neb.
1996) (holding that Title VII does not apply to the prison setting when prisoners are
mandated to work in prison-run industries); Wilkerson v. Samuels, 524 F. App’x 776, 779
(3d Cir. 2013) (holding that Title VII does not apply to prisoners because the relationship
between the inmate and prison is not one of employment but arises out of the prisoner’s
status as an inmate).
26. See Jackson Taylor Kirklin, Note, Title VII Protections for Inmates: A Model
Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in America’s Prisons, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1048,
1089 (2011).
27. See, e.g., Spencer Woodman, California Blames Incarcerated Workers for Unsafe
Conditions and Amputations, INTERCEPT (Dec. 28, 2016, 11:23 AM), https://theintercept
.com/2016/12/28/california-blames-incarcerated-workers-for-unsafe-conditions-and-am
putations [https://perma.cc/SZ6B-EA78].
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split regarding the application of employment discrimination statutes to prisoners based on varying definitions of the term employee.
Part III explores problems under both approaches in the circuit split
and explains why both approaches fail incarcerated workers. Finally,
Part IV argues that the out-of-date circuit split should be abandoned,
and that, regardless of which test determines incarcerated workers’
employee status, courts should determine that prison laborers are
employees and thus covered by employment discrimination statutes.
This change would fulfill the statutes’ purposes of protecting workers and creating safer work environments for all workers.28
I. OVERVIEW OF PRISON LABOR
Before delving into the applicable law, the following sections
chronicle the history of American prison labor and the heightened
need for modern employment protections for incarcerated workers.
A. Early History of Prison Labor in the United States
Prison labor has been a global pandemic since the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries when Venetian and Florentine naval galleys
used prison labor to run their ships.29 The brutal use of prison labor
played an instrumental role in the rise of empires across the globe,30
and the United States was no exception.31
The use of prison labor was quickly revolutionized in the United
States.32 In the early nineteenth century, the rise of factory work
and urbanization in Northern states along with worker rebellions
led to a scarcity of labor, leaving many states unable to grow their new
industrialized economies.33 In the 1820s, New York turned to prisoners to fulfill its need for a labor force in an experiment at Auburn
Prison.34 Auburn Prison was the first prison to profit from the labor
of its inmates in the United States.35 The system Auburn developed
28. See id.
29. See Christian G. De Vito & Alex Lichtenstein, Writing a Global History of Convict
Labour, 58 INTERNATIONAAL INSTITUUT VOOR SOCIALE GESCHINDENIS 285, 294 (2013).
30. See id. at 289.
31. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1052.
32. Id.
33. Genevieve LeBaron, Slaves of the State: American Prison Labour Past and
Present, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond
-trafficking-and-slavery/slaves-of-state-american-prison-labour-past-and-present [https://
perma.cc/TH3A-3CBM].
34. See REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS,
AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941 17 (2009).
35. Auburn Prison Ledgers: An Inventory of the Collection at Syracuse University,
SYRACUSE UNIV. LIBR., https://library.syr.edu/digital/guides/print/auburn_prison_prt.htm
[https://perma.cc/3XAC-87BX] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
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involved sentencing offenders to “fortress-like prisons . . . [selling] the
convicts’ labor power to private manufacturers, who set up shop in
the prison and put their prisoner laborers to . . . ‘congregate labor’ by
day; and locked their prisoner-workers down in great stone cellhouses by night.”36 The system was supported by stripping convicts of
their rights and “the liberal infliction of corporal punishments.”37
Despite the brutality of the New York system, it spread to become the main mode of punishment for incarcerated individuals in the
majority of Northern states after 1830.38 Essentially, these “[p]rison
factories . . . were penal-social laboratories,” where “[t]he whip made
men living machines” and managers used “violent methods of discipline.”39 This new penal labor system continued to thrive in the North
while at the same time, a concurrent system was designed in the
South to maximize prison labor in a different yet equally brutal way.40
B. Post–Civil War Prison Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery but explicitly
permitted the forced use of prisoners for labor.41 Slavery was not
abolished, but merely reformed and forced upon the incarcerated
population.42
Emancipation of the enslaved population created a crisis for
agricultural economies because they had relied on enslaved labor to
drive its growth while keeping costs low.43 Slave states passed laws,44
36. MCLENNAN, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. LeBaron, supra note 33.
40. See Morgan Jerkins, Opinion, Bones That Revealed a Texas Town’s Forgotten
Racial Past Deserve Respect, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2019 02:00 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/07/sugar-land-imperial-prison-farm-cemetery
-prisoners-remains [https://perma.cc/B8KH-WWAK].
41. “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. This continued despite the fact that United Nations
guidelines on how to treat incarcerated individuals (also known as the Nelson Mandela
Rules) says that prisoners should not be held in slavery and deserve fair wages as well
as safe work conditions. G.A. Res. A/RES/70/175, The Nelson Mandela Rules, at 29
(Dec. 17, 2015).
43. The slave economy was the foundation of the Southern economy; once slavery was
banned, the South had to devise a new system of labor to replace it. See Sharecropping
and Changes in the Southern Economy, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperi
ence/features/reconstruction-sharecropping-and-changes-southern-economy [https://
perma.cc/LQ47-T9F2] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
44. In late 1865, Mississippi and South Carolina were the first states to enact Black
Codes. See Black Codes, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/black-codes
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otherwise known as Black Codes,45 which selectively re-incarcerated
freed slaves to continue forcibly using their labor46 through the
practice of convict leasing.47 Black codes targeted Black people by
having them arrested for minor violations, punished with major
fines, and then imprisoned until they could pay their debts.48 The
convict leasing system explicitly operated to earn profit, not to rehabilitate.49
Southern states that used convict leasing would lease prisoners
to railways, plantations, and other businesses in exchange for payment.50 Convict leasing became “a functional replacement for slavery,
a human bridge between the Old South and the New.”51 Incarcerated
individuals worked in excruciating conditions and were often bought
and sold like enslaved people.52 Convicts faced “brutal beating, whipping, food deprivation, and sadistic torture” for their convictions.53
Lessees often invested less in convicted individuals than they had
in enslaved persons because it mattered even less to their economic
bottom line if their leased labor lived or died.54
[https://perma.cc/PV92-7KCF] (last updated Jan. 21 2021). Alabama, Louisiana, Florida,
Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia quickly followed suit. See, e.g., WILLIAM
COHEN, AT FREEDOM’S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR
RACIAL CONTROL 1861–1915 31 (1991).
45. Black Codes collectively refer to statutes that criminalized a wide variety of
behaviors, such as vagrancy and unauthorized breach of contract by a Black employee
with a white employer, that were designed to incarcerate Black individuals and ensure
their continued availability as a labor force. See Black Codes, supra note 44.
46. Of the nine states that adopted Black Codes during the period of 1865–1866, all
except North Carolina allowed convict leasing. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 33.
47. See Stian Rice, Farmers Turn to Prisons to Fill Labor Needs, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(June 12, 2019), https://www.hcn.org/articles/agriculture-farmers-turn-to-prisons-labor
-to-fill-labor-needs [https://perma.cc/E5VK-SG32] (one of the main methods of prison
labor was convict leasing); see, e.g., Convict Leasing, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://eji.org/news/history-racial-injustice-convict-leasing [https://perma.cc/PL7J-GRA8].
48. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 156 (2012).
49. Shane Bauer, The True History of America’s Private Prison Industry, TIME (Sept. 25,
2018, 3:00 PM), https://time.com/5405158/the-true-history-of-americas-private-prison-in
dustry [https://perma.cc/82E6-VWB7]; see also James Gray Pope, Mass Incarceration,
Convict Leasing, and the Thirteenth Amendment: A Revisionist Account, 94 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1465, 1469 (2019) (explaining that convict leasing systems were operated for profit,
not for any penological goals).
50. Convict Leasing, supra note 47.
51. Pope, supra note 49, at 1507 (quoting DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”:
PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 57 (1996)).
52. Christopher Muller, Freedom and Convict Leasing in the Postbellum South, 124
AM. J. SOCIO. 367, 368 (2018).
53. Pope, supra note 49, at 1507.
54. See Mary Rose Whitehouse, Note, Modern Prison Labor: A Reemergence of Convict Leasing under the Guise of Rehabilitation and Private Enterprises, 18 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 89, 96 (2017); see also Alex Lichtenstein, Chain Gangs: How Did We Get to This
Point?, SOUTHCOAST TODAY (Jan. 11, 2011, 10:30 PM), https://www.southcoasttoday.com
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Despite the brutality of convict leasing, the system continued
to operate until the 1930s.55 Proponents of the leasing system argued that forced labor was “an essential element of an inmate’s
punishment,” emphasizing “the rehabilitative value of a structured
work environment” rather than the prison’s pecuniary gain.56 The
system eventually met its demise because of economic concerns
rather than humanitarian ones.57 Unions complained that convict
leasing allowed companies that used leasing to provide their goods
at a far lower cost than companies that did not rely on leasing.58 The
system soon transitioned to utilizing chain gangs to ensure the
continued availability of a labor force while lessening the impact on
union workers.59
C. The Use of Chain Gangs
As states left convict leasing behind, prisoners were increasingly forced to work in chain gangs.60 Although chain gangs existed
as early as the nineteenth century, they did not become common until
the 1920s and 1930s.61
The term chain gang evolved from the fact that prisoners had
shackles attached to each ankle with a heavy chain connecting
them.62 To turn a profit and avoid some of the previous conflicts with
unions in the private industry, chain gangs were leased to states,
rather than private companies.63 Chain gang systems were usually
/article/20000804/OPINION/308049937 [https://perma.cc/V3KK-4E4X] (explaining that
“[i]f a convict died, another one was always available from the ‘penitentiary’ for the same
low price,” discouraging the lessees from providing humane treatment).
55. See Convict Leasing, supra note 47.
56. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1054.
57. Whitehouse, supra note 54, at 96; see also Matthew J. Mancini, Race, Economics,
and the Abandonment of Convict Leasing, 63 J. NEGRO HIST. 339, 349 (1978) (explaining
that it was not until the system of convict leasing lost its profitability that it was
abandoned).
58. See Whitehouse, supra note 54, at 96.
59. See id.
60. Jaron Browne, Rooted in Slavery: Prison Labor Exploitation, REIMAGINE RACE,
POVERTY & THE ENV’T, https://www.reimaginerpe.org/node/856#:~:text=The%20chain%20
gangs%20originated%20as,worked%2C%20ate%2C%20and%20slept [https://perma.cc
/DVX3-QNYL] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
61. See Chain Gangs, ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences
/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/chain-gangs [https://perma.cc/FU3R-P2WW]
(last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
62. Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1997).
63. See Whitehouse, supra note 54, at 96–97.
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used in agricultural labor and road work.64 Overseers generally divided incarcerated individuals by ability and “then pushed each gang
to its limits.”65 Being in a chain gang was almost always a punishment reserved for Black people; ninety percent of people placed in the
chain gangs were Black.66
Ironically, many people saw chain gangs as a more “humane
alternative” to the convict leasing system.67 However, the fact that “the
iconic image of chain gangs comprised of shackled convicts tethered
together and laboring in the hot sun is inseparable from American
history” would imply otherwise.68 One former member described the
systematic exploitation and brutalization of the chain gangs as torture.69 Prisoners in chain gangs were subjected to extreme overwork,
beatings, poor living conditions, and poor diets.70 Like convict leasing, it was economic concerns, not humanitarian ones, that ended it.71
Chain gangs largely fell out of practice during the Great Depression because jobs were scarce and people complained that chain
gangs took “work that rightfully belonged to free labor[ers].”72 Responding to the criticism and seeking to create jobs in an increasingly
depressed economy, the federal government officially prohibited the
use of prisoners in building federally financed roads.73
Moreover, race played a major role in the reduction of chain
gangs.74 When the number of white inmates increased, the gangs
became less popular.75 However, they did not disappear altogether.76
64. N.E.H. Hull, Book Review: Working on the Chain Gang: Alex Lichtenstein, Twice
the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the New South., 8
CRIM. L.F. 311, 313 (1997).
65. Id.
66. Lichtenstein, supra note 54.
67. Id.
68. Whitehouse, supra note 54, at 96.
69. Peloso, supra note 62, at 1466 (quoting ROBERT E. BURNS, I AM A FUGITIVE FROM
A GEORGIA CHAIN GANG! 56 (1932)).
70. See id. at 1465–67. Some chain gangs had death rates as high as 45% from the
brutality of the labor and poor conditions. Id.
71. See Christopher Angevine, The Consociative Value of Work: What HomelessnessTo-Work Programs Can Teach Us About Reforming and Expanding Prison Labor, 4 CRIM.
L. BRIEF 19, 22 (2009).
72. Chain Gangs, supra note 61.
73. See Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 365 (1998).
74. See Chain Gangs, supra note 61.
75. See id.
76. Chain gangs came back into popular use in the 1990s, with Alabama, Arizona,
Florida, Iowa, Oklahoma, Nevada, Tennessee, and Wisconsin allowing the use of chain
gangs once again. See Peloso, supra note 62, at 1459. They lasted for a short time
everywhere but Arizona; Arizona only recently rid itself of chain gangs when Sheriff Joe
Arpaio was voted out in 2017. See, e.g., Meg O’Connor, ‘Nation’s Only Female Chain
Gang’ Apparently Disbanded, PHX. NEW TIMES (May 2, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www
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In fact, neither did convict leasing; there has been a reemergence of
the convict-leasing system in the modern prison system that “serves
to meet the ever-growing need of our capitalist society.”77 Mass incarceration replaced the convict leasing and chain gang systems to
continue slavery under another name.78
D. The Rise of Mass Incarceration
The United States has a “long history of exploiting inmate labor
to make prisons and penal farms highly productive and lucrative.”79
However, the prison population was not always as large, nor was the
scope of prison labor as wide, as it currently is.80 Today, the United
States has the highest incarceration rate in the world with a shocking
incarceration rate of approximately 655 people per 100,000 people,
with nearly 2.2 million individuals currently incarcerated.81 “Mass
incarceration has, in effect, become an avenue for forced labor . . .
with clear links to racial discrimination.”82
The prison population surged in the 1970s when politicians
used fearmongering to push increasingly punitive policies aimed at
incarcerating and penalizing people of color.83 Politicians linked race
to crime and enacted harsh punitive measures purportedly to combat
the rising crime rates.84 As “[g]rowing disillusionment” with the
rehabilitative goals of prisons emerged in society, conservative
.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/nations-only-female-chain-gang-boasts-the-mcso-website
-11279199.
77. Whitehouse, supra note 54, at 97.
78. See, e.g., Aristotle Jones, The Evolution: Slavery To Mass Incarceration, HUFFPOST
(Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-evolution-slavery-to-mass-incarcera
tion_b_57f66820e4b087a29a54880f [https://perma.cc/4ECD-HPY3]. Like in the convict
leasing system, mass incarceration has marked a time where “the criminal justice system
was strategically employed to force African-Americans back into a system of extreme
repression and control.” ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 32.
79. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 58.
80. See James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(July 20, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-mass
-incarceration [https://perma.cc/F4U7-G7G7].
81. See Drew Kann, 5 Facts Behind America’s High Incarceration Rate, CNN (Apr. 21,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarceration-five-key-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6YMM-LHZK].
82. Prison Labor and Modern Slavery, FREEDOM UNITED [hereinafter Prison Labor],
https://www.freedomunited.org/prison-labor-and-modern-slavery [https://perma.cc/8JNF
-AJ38] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
83. See Cullen, supra note 80.
84. Ruth Delaney, Ram Subramanian, Alison Shames & Nicholas Turner, American
History, Race, and Prison, VERA (Sept. 2018), https://www.vera.org/reimagining-prison
-web-report/american-history-race-and-prison [https://perma.cc/H22Y-JQQ5].
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politicians were able to move penal policy in a more punitive direction.85 Politicians exploited and capitalized on this disillusionment by
adopting “tough on crime” policies and promising citizens a return
to “law and order.”86
“Tough on crime” candidates followed through on their promises.87
With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, “[p]ractically overnight
the budgets of federal law enforcement agencies soared”88 along with
the passing of more severe penalties for offenses89 and a mandate to
fight a War on Drugs.90 During this time, the number of prisoners
in federal and state prisons rapidly increased from approximately
196,000 people in 1970 to 2.3 million in 2013.91
Most of these prisoners are Black and Brown.92 The War on
Drugs enforced explicitly racist policies.93 For example, the AntiDrug Abuse Act central to the War on Drugs featured a “100-to-1
powder cocaine-to-crack disparity,”94 despite no difference between
the drugs, because Black people were more likely to be convicted of
crack cocaine offenses and white people were more likely to be
85. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 16. Partly responsible for that growing disillusionment was the increasing crime rates in the 1960s from a growing population, which
created an opening for politicians to push more punitive policies. See ALEXANDER, supra
note 48, at 41.
86. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 42. These terms continue to be used by
politicians today as racial dog-whistles. See also Geoff Nunberg, Is Trump’s Call for ‘Law
and Order’ A Coded Racial Message?, NPR (July 28, 2016, 3:06 PM), https://www.npr.org
/2016/07/28/487560886/is-trumps-call-for-law-and-order-a-coded-racial-message [https://
perma.cc/H22Y-JQQ5].
87. See, e.g., Ed Kilgore, Trump Is Reviving the Disgraceful Legacy of ‘Law-andOrder’ Politics, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER: WHAT’S PAST IS PROLOGUE, June 3, 2020,
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/06/trump-law-and-order-politics-nixon-reagan.html
[https://perma.cc/THQ2-DWWX].
88. ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 49.
89. See War on Drugs, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/crime/the-war-on-drugs
[https://perma.cc/7JDT-Y3K2] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
90. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 49. Although President Nixon introduced
the concept of a War on Drugs, it did not truly take off until President Reagan took
office. Id. The War on Drugs operated as a “New Jim Crow,” with officials allowing the
smuggling of drugs into communities of color and then disproportionately targeting those
same communities for arrest and incarceration. Id.
91. See Mass Incarceration: The Great American Folly, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb. 5,
2013), https://bangordailynews.com/2013/02/05/opinion/mass-incarceration-the-great-ameri
can-folly [https://perma.cc/KSF5-8JJJ].
92. See, e.g., Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie in
2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/factsheets
/pie2020_allimages.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JQ7-KAAD].
93. See Racial Double Standard in Drug Laws Persists Today, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/news/racial-double-standard-in-drug-laws-persists-today [https://perma
.cc/4TYM-5SYC] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
94. Id.
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convicted of powder cocaine offenses.95 The racist policies and disparate enforcement of the War on Drugs and other tough on crime
measures of the twentieth century has led to people of color representing a whopping 67% of the prison population despite making up
only 37% of the country’s population.96 Notably, Black individuals
make up 40% of the incarcerated population despite representing
only 13% of the population.97
E. From Mass Incarceration to a Mass Labor Force
Mass incarceration dramatically increased the prison labor force.98
Approximately half of all prisoners are forced to work as part of
their sentence, and more voluntarily work, creating a prison labor
force of 1.5 million people.99 Roughly 870,000 incarcerated individuals work full-time jobs while in prison.100 Some work to maintain the
prison, often termed “prison housework,”101 while others perform
manual labor outside of the prison or work to produce goods.102
The broad range of work performed by the incarcerated has inextricably intertwined mass incarceration with the labor market.103
A 2004 economic analysis of labor in state and federal prisons over
the previous year found that incarcerated individuals produced more
than 2 billion dollars’ worth of commodities, including both goods
and services.104 Prison labor is cheap because prisoners are paid
95. What Is The Difference Between Cocaine And Crack?, DRUG POL’Y, https://drug
policy.org/drug-facts/cocaine/difference-crack [https://perma.cc/KKE9-Z5ZL] (last visited
Nov. 4, 2021).
96. Who’s in Prison in America?, OPENINVEST, https://www.openinvest.com/articles-in
sights/statistics-prison-america [https://perma.cc/N8PW-LAPL] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
97. Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-byState Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma.cc/G3B6-L9AH].
98. See Prison Labor, supra note 82.
99. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
100. See J.S. Welsh, Note, Sex Discrimination in Prison: Title VII Protections for
America’s Incarcerated Workers, 42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 477, 477 (2019).
101. Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 868, 870 (2008)
(describing “prison housework” as work incarcerated individuals do to contribute directly
to internal operations of the prison, including cooking meals and doing laundry, and explaining that this work is extremely valuable to prisons. One Kentucky county estimated
that prison housework saved it approximately three million dollars in one year).
102. See id. at 868.
103. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Federal Government Markets Prison Labor
to Businesses as the “Best-Kept Secret,” VOX (Aug. 24, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox
.com/2018/8/24/17768438/national-prison-strike-factory-labor [https://perma.cc/Y9LH-Z6J9].
104. Ruben J. Garcia, Mass Incarceration, Forced Labor, and Your Morning Cup of Coffee,
UNIV. NEV., LAS VEGAS (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.unlv.edu/news/article/mass-incarcera
tion-forced-labor-and-your-morning-cup-coffee [https://perma.cc/M374-F3JD]; see also
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significantly less than minimum wage,105 which creates such a large
profit that a “labor-market incentive [arises] for mass incarceration.”106
Incarcerated individuals make office furniture for state universities and the federal government, hotel reservations at call centers,
body armor for the military, license plates, and fashion accessories.107 Work can range anywhere from fighting fires108 to computer
coding, farm work, video production, and shipping fulfillment services.109 Private businesses have turned to prison labor as well, with
well-known companies like Walmart,110 Victoria’s Secret, Starbucks,
and Microsoft all using some form of prison labor.111 Furthermore,
prison labor is “overwhelmingly performed by minorities,”112 paralleling the convict leasing and chain gang labor systems.113
Despite the United States’ laws ban importing prison labor goods
from other countries, “there is no parallel statutory provision prohibiting . . . [United States’] . . . exports” of prison labor goods.114
Through this loophole, the United States has created a monopoly on
the prison labor market domestically and a global market for their
prison labor, leading to even more profit for those that employ them.115
Katherine E. Leung, Note, Prison Labor as a Lawful Form of Race Discrimination, 53 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L.REV.681, 682 (2018) (explaining that “[p]risoners in the United States have historically been required to perform manual labor as a component of their punishment.”).
105. The average federal prison worker earns $0.92 per hour. See David R. Henderson,
The Bottom One Percent, HOOVER INST. (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.hoover.org/research
/bottom-one-percent [https://perma.cc/J7QE-WUJH]. The average state prison worker
is paid anywhere between $0.14 to $0.63 per hour inside the institution, and between
$0.33 and $1.41 per hour outside of the prison. See Alison Knezevich, Thousands Of
Maryland Inmates Work In Prison. A New Law Shows Us How Much They’re Paid, BALT.
SUN (Jan. 2, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-prison-wages
-20200102-6kjx5nzhtzfw3fmin662lcqcqm-story.html [https://perma.cc/9GH7-4T2Q].
106. See Campbell, supra note 103.
107. See Zatz, supra note 101, at 868.
108. See German Lopez, California Is Using Prison Labor to Fight its Record Wildfires,
VOX (Aug. 9, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/9/17670494/california-prison
-labor-mendocino-carr-ferguson-wildfires [https://perma.cc/JD6J-GUCC]. California has
recently been criticized for its use of prison labor to fight fires while paying inmates only
a dollar every hour plus two dollars a day. Id.
109. See Campbell, supra note 103.
110. See Sophie Alexander, Walmart Reviews Prison Labor Policy Amid Civil Unrest
Over Race, SEATTLE TIMES (June 24, 2020, 4:50 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/busi
ness/walmart-reviews-prison-labor-policy-amid-civil-unrest-over-race [https://perma.cc
/6D35-BEFE].
111. Garcia, supra note 104.
112. Lan Cao, Made in the USA: Race, Trade, and Prison Labor, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (2019).
113. See Prison Labor, supra note 82 (describing the labor exploitation of prisoners as
“ ‘prison slavery,’ with those incarcerated being farmed out to local governments and
companies to perform labor for just pennies a day”).
114. Cao, supra note 112, at 7.
115. See id. at 6.
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Employment discrimination runs rampant in the prison work
setting,116 yet courts routinely and incorrectly deny incarcerated
individuals protection against discrimination.117
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE APPLICABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES TO INCARCERATED WORKERS
A circuit split arose in the late 1980s and 1990s on the issue of
whether employment discrimination statutes apply to incarcerated
individuals.118 The split occurred because courts disagree over whether
incarcerated individuals are “employees” with legal standing to bring
suit under employment discrimination statutes.119 In light of the
history and modern realities of prison labor,120 as well as the employment discrimination that prisoner-employees face,121 the circuit
split should be re-examined.
A. Essential Determination of “Employee” Status
In employment discrimination suits, the crucial issue is whether
the plaintiff constitutes an employee under the relevant statute.122
The answer determines whether the individual has standing to bring
an employment discrimination claim.123 Title VII, the ADA, and the
ADEA vaguely define an employee as an “individual employed by an
employer.”124 Because this definition is so vague, courts utilize a
variety of tests to determine whether an individual is an employee
and therefore entitled to protections.125
116. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 100, at 478 (explaining that sexual harassment by
supervisors is “a pervasive element of life” in prisons that could be reduced with the
statutory protections from Title VII); see also Sessi Kuwabara Blanchard, Labor Law
Doesn’t Apply if You’re in Prison, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 30, 2019), https://truthout.org/articles
/labor-law-doesnt-apply-if-youre-in-prison [https://perma.cc/7RMC-ZFSJ] (describing the
story of Kendall Charles Alexander, an African-American man whose work supervisor
refused to increase Alexander’s wages due to his racial bias).
117. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
118. See discussion infra Section II.B.
119. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1991); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2008); Age Discrimination and Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. 630(f) (1990). For a discussion on the importance of the classification of “employee,” see, for example, Charles J. Muhl, What Is an Employee? The Answer Depends
on the Federal Law, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 5 (2002), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002
/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4T4-RW46].
120. See discussion, supra Section I.A.
121. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1061.
123. See Valerie L. Jacobson, Bringing a Title VII Action: Which Test Regarding
Standing to Sue Is the Most Applicable, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 95, 105 (1990).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).
125. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1063.
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Some courts use the primary purpose test to examine the statutory purpose of Title VII and other laws to determine whether individuals are employees.126 The primary purpose test analyzes the
broad legislative intent rather than the reality of a plaintiff’s employment.127 Employment status is relative and changes on a caseby-case basis depending on the statute in question.128 Courts often
misapply the primary purpose test as its application is murky.129 For
example, in Williams v. Meese,130 the Court utilized a version of the
primary purpose test and found that an employment relationship
did not exist because the primary purpose of the association was
incarceration and not employment.131 However, courts rarely use the
primary purpose test alone because employment status requires
some analysis of the relationship between the individuals rather
than relying on the purpose of the statute alone.132
Another common test courts use, the economic realities test,
asks whether the worker is an employee “as a matter of economic
reality.”133 This is determined by examining whether a worker is
“economically dependent” on the employer, using the following factors:
the nature and degree of control; special skills needed; relative investment of the employee and opportunity for profit; the centrality
of the work to the employer’s business; and the permanence of the
work.134 Many courts use the economic realities test for Title VII and
ADEA cases, but it has actually been applied by courts as more of
a hybrid test because most courts still examine the right to control
as emphasized in the common law test for employment.135
The Supreme Court has adopted the common law test to determine employee status under Title I of the ADA.136 Despite taking
126. See id. at 1064.
127. See id.
128. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 300 (2001).
129. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1079–80.
130. See discussion of the Williams case, infra Section II.B.
131. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1070.
132. See id. at 1076.
133. See id. at 1064 (quoting United States v. Silk, 441 U.S. 704, 713 (1947)).
134. See Todd Lebowitz, What Is the Economic Realities Test?, WHO IS MY EMP. (Jan. 10,
2017), https://whoismyemployee.com/2017/01/10/what-is-the-economic-realities-test/#:~:
text=The%20Economic%20Realities%20Test%20seeks,a%20contractor%20or%20an%
20employee [http://perma.cc/N9T9-Y9NG].
135. See, e.g., Orla O’Callaghan, Comment, Independent Contractor Injustice: The Case
for Amending Discriminatory Discrimination Laws, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1196 (2018)
(explaining that cases like Spirides purport to use the economic realities test but in fact
use a hybrid approach that also focuses on the right to control).
136. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003)
(adopting the common law test for determining employee status for claims of disability
employment discrimination under Title I of the ADA).
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many considerations into account the common law test still emphasizes the “right to control.”137 These factors include:
(1) the extent of control which it is agreed that the employer may
exercise over the details of the work; (2) whether or not the worker
is engaged in a distinct business or occupation; (3) the kind of
occupation, and whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision; (4) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(5) whether the employer or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the workplace; (6) the length of time for which
the person is employed; (7) the method of payment, whether by
the time worked or by the job; (8) whether or not the work is a
part of the regular business of the employer; (9) whether or not
the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship; and (10) whether or not the worker does business
with others.138

Despite taking many considerations into account, the common law
test still focuses on the right to control.139
Finally, the hybrid test combines principles from the economic
realities test and the common law test.140 The hybrid test considers
“the economic realities of the work relationship as a critical factor in
[the] determination [of employee status] but focus[es] on the employer’s right to control the work process as the determinative factor.”141
The tests developed for employee status, although containing
similarities, have key distinctions.142 However, no matter what test
is used by courts, incarcerated workers should be recognized as
employees to create avenues of redressability for discrimination that
occurs in the prison workplace.143
B. Initial Circuit Split on Employee Status
In 1988, the Ninth Circuit encountered the question of whether
prisons could be protected by employment discrimination statutes
in the prison workplace in Baker v. McNeil Island Correctional
137. See O’Callaghan, supra note 135, at 1194–95.
138. Id. at 1195 (quoting Myra H. Barron, Who’s an Independent Contractor? Who’s
an Employee?, 14 LAB. LAW. 457, 458 (1999)).
139. See Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, IRS (July 2, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor
-self-employed-or-employee [https://perma.cc/VC7F-ZE7T].
140. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1065.
141. See O’Callaghan, supra note 135, at 1195–96 (citing Muhl, supra note 119, at 3, 10).
142. See Muhl, supra note 119, at 9.
143. See discussion, infra Part IV.
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Center.144 In this case, Baker averred that, despite his qualifications,
he was not chosen for a library aide position because he was Black.145
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that Title VII
did not apply to prison work assignments, finding that Baker’s
complaint should not have been dismissed.146 Using the Spirides
factors, the Court held that the most important factor, the right to
control, strongly indicated an employment relationship between the
prisoner and the prison.147 Even if that did not control, the Court
found that Baker’s pleadings sufficiently alleged that his work was
more akin to that of work release than “regular” prison work because
Baker would be working with the state’s librarian.148 In deciding the
case, the Ninth Circuit essentially held that optional job opportunities for prisoners can render an incarcerated worker an employee,
even though the statute does not state or imply that employment
must be optional.149
Three years later in 1991, the Tenth Circuit faced a similar question in Williams v. Meese, which is the most cited prisoner employment discrimination case.150 Williams alleged that the prison denied
him work assignments he was qualified for on the basis of his race,
age, or disability, and that the prison retaliated against him for
filing administrative grievances.151 Williams was a Black inmate
who suffered from hypertension, circulatory problems, and other leg
issues.152 Despite these injuries, he was assigned to work in construction and was “passed over for other employment [opportunities]
in favor of ‘the [white] or young and non handicapped inmates.’”153
He described being passed over for positions in the law library and
chaplaincy despite his need for an accommodation.154 The Tenth
144. See Baker v. McNeil Island Correctional Ctr., 859 F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir. 1988).
145. Id. at 127 (explaining that Baker was not chosen for the position, despite the fact
of the prison employee in charge of inmate assignments telling him he was “next in line”
and he had the “capability to do the job,” because the state librarian did not want to
work with a Black man).
146. See id. at 126.
147. Id. at 128; see Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831–32 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (using
twelve factors based on both the economic realities test and the common law test).
148. Baker, 859 F.2d at 128 (explaining that the EEOC released guidance stating that
Title VII applied to prisoners eligible for work release and that the library aide position
in this case may be more akin to work release than forced labor).
149. See id.
150. See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 994 (1991); see also the 1,778 Citing
References from KeyCite for Williams v. Meese.
151. See Williams, 926 F.2d at 996.
152. Williams v. Meese, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4072, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 1990).
153. Id. at *1–2.
154. See id. at *2. Outside of the prison context, construction and library positions
generally are the basis of an employment relationship. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros.
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Circuit, using a version of the primary purpose test, held that because “his relationship with the Bureau of Prisons, and therefore,
with the . . . [prison officials], arises out of his status as an inmate,
not an employee,” he could not be protected under neither Title VII
nor the ADEA.155 The Court recognized that the relationship contained common elements of an employment relationship, yet they
still found that the relationship’s “primary purpose” arose from
Williams “having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in
the [officials’] correctional institution.”156 The outcome of the Williams
case is logically inconsistent with the primary purpose test.157 Instead of looking at the primary purpose of the statute and its intent
to protect employees, the Court focused on the primary purpose of
the relationship between the incarcerated worker and the prison.158
The Court unilaterally declared that because one aspect of their
relationship arose out of incarceration, there could be no employment relationship.159 The Court went as far as to cite to Baker to
support the assertion that there was no employment relationship
between incarcerated workers and prisons.160 Even if one were to
follow the Court’s rationale to its logical end by accepting the premise that the Court was not incorrect in looking at the purpose of the
relationship, their holding in Williams defies logic.161 The primary
purpose of the relationship, considering the history of prison labor,
is clearly profit for the institution itself.162 Because of the Court’s
unwillingness to recognize rights for incarcerated people and the
brutal history of prison labor, the Court misinterpreted the primary
purpose test and created a fundamentally unsound exception to
employment discrimination statutes for incarcerated workers.163 The
holdings in both Williams and Baker have been extended to claims
under the ADEA and ADA.164
Constr. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2013) (implying that employee status as
a construction worker was not in question in a Title VII inquiry); see also Johnson v.
Mao, 174 F. Supp. 3d 500, 502–03 (D.D.C. 2016) (assuming that an employee at the
Library of Congress was an employee for the purposes of Title VII).
155. Williams, 926 F.2d at 997.
156. Id.
157. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1064 (describing the primary purpose test as intending to examine the broad purpose of the statute to determine if individuals are employees).
158. See Williams, 926 F.2d at 997.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1080 (explaining that the Court did not “take into
account the developments in the modern prison workplace over the past thirty years.”).
162. See discussion supra Section I.D.
163. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1081.
164. See, e.g., Vernacchio v. Davis, No. 19-CV-07171, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23639, at
*3–4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2020) (holding that prisoners can be employees under the
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C. Application of the Circuit Split Today
A prisoner’s ability to obtain relief from employment discrimination has been functionally narrowed by Williams and Baker, insulating
prisons from liability for discriminating against prisoner-employees
in the work setting.165 The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits followed
the Tenth Circuit’s Williams approach, barring all employment discrimination claims from incarcerated workers.166 The Sixth, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits followed the Ninth Circuit’s Baker approach
and limited the availability of remedies to only optional job opportunities.167 The Ninth Circuit further clarified Baker in Moyo v. Gomez,
where the Court, in determining employee status, emphasized that
the position at issue, “while not work release, paid a salary and included some training.”168 Under this approach, “inmates performing
work assignments that include compensation or training, or that
resemble work release rather than forced labor, may be employees
entitled to protection.”169 This distinction is flawed.170 Most forced
prison labor, not just optional labor, requires some form of payment
and training.171 To further muddy the waters, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released multiple informal
discussion letters following the circuit split, usually falling on the
ADEA); Positano v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:13-CV-01570, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83351, at *1 (M.D. Penn. May 16, 2018) (holding that a prisoner’s application to
a position in dog-handling stated a cognizable claim under the ADA because it was an
optional job opportunity).
165. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1070 (inferring that, under the Williams approach,
it is difficult to hold prisons liable for discrimination against a prisoner in a work
setting); see also Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2013) (inferring
that, under the Baker approach, there are only a few instances where a prisoner can be
found to be an employee).
166. See, e.g., Quinones v. N.Y.C., No. 19-CV-05400, 2020 WL 5665142, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2020) (stating that while the Second Circuit has not directly concluded Title VII
is inapplicable to prisoners, district courts in the circuit have); see Wilkerson v. Samuels,
524 F. App’x. 777, 779 (3d Cir. 2013); Smith v. Gonzales, No. I:17-CV-0093-BL, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31836, at *11–12 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2018).
167. See, e.g., Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at
*13 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2008); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992);
Renda v. Iowa Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 784 N.W. 2d 8, 19 (Iowa 2010).
168. Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994).
169. Vernacchio v. Davis, No. 19-cv-07171 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23639, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 11, 2020).
170. See Charles Decker, Time to Reckon with Prison Labor, INST. SOC. & POL’Y STUD.
(Oct. 2013), https://isps.yale.edu/news/blog/2013/10/time-to-reckon-with-prison-labor-0
[https://perma.cc/WQ63-P58B].
171. See id. The pay difference between forced labor and optional labor is not large:
incarcerated workers forced into jobs serving the prison make approximately 12 cents
to 40 cents per hour and can make between 23 cents to $1.15 per hour working for
outside businesses. See id.
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side of Williams rather than Baker despite the untenability of both
approaches.172
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACHES AND
BARRIERS TO FINDING A SOLUTION
A. Issues with the Williams and Baker Approaches
The Baker and Williams frameworks are unworkable and fail
to protect workers.173 Both approaches prevent prisoners who act as
employees from bringing claims regarding employment discrimination against the Department of Corrections simply due to the fact of
their incarceration.174
The Williams approach ignores the fact that prisoners actually
act as employees.175 Given the historic and expansive nature of work
that incarcerated individuals perform,176 it is untenable to say that
all incarcerated workers are not employees. The logical reasoning of
Williams itself does not hold up under scrutiny because its application
of the primary purpose test was incorrect and outdated.177 Williams’
situation is exactly what employment discrimination statutes were
created to protect against outside of prison walls.178 Despite its
172. See, e.g., EEOC Informal Discussion Letter: Title VII/Conviction Policy/Prison
Inmate/Religion/Work Program, EEOC (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/foia/eeoc
-informal-discussion-letter-315 [https://perma.cc/D9ZB-NEKK] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021)
(stating that “if the work, or lack of work, is based on incarceration, it is not covered by
Title VII”); EEOC Compl. Manual § 2(B)(3)(a)(III), EEOC (May 12, 2000), https://www
.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-2-threshold-issues#2-III-B-3-a-iii [https://perma.cc/7TQR
-DAZU] (stating that “[a] prison does not have an employment relationship with its own
prisoners”). While EEOC guidance may be instructive, it is not a regulation that has the
force of law. The plain language of the statute still controls. See, e.g., Robert A. Marsico,
Guidance and Regulation—What’s the Big Difference?, SCARINCI HOLLENBACK (Oct. 16,
2018), https://scarincihollenbeck.com/law-firm-insights/business-law/guidance-and-regu
lation-difference [https://perma.cc/L7BH-MBAB].
173. See Kathleen K. Ross, Note, Prisoners As Employees Under Title VII: Baker v.
McNeil Island Corrections Center, 31 B.C. L. REV 203, 211 (1989); Kirklin, supra note 26,
at 1070, 1080.
174. See Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
a prisoner who performs forced labor is not considered an employee because, under
Baker, prisoners are defined as employees in narrow circumstances); Kirklin, supra note
26, at 1081.
175. See Benns, supra note 15 (explaining that while “one could reasonably expect
some degree of compliance with modern labor standards” by prisons as “prison labor has
expanded in scope and reach,” prisons are able to refuse compliance with modern day
standards because “courts have ruled that the relationship between the penitentiary and
the inmate worker is not primarily economic; thus, the worker is not protected under the
statutes” and retain no protections from statutes designed to protect employees).
176. See discussion, supra Section I.E.
177. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1080–81.
178. See discussion, supra Section II.B.
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problems, three circuits have adopted the Williams approach.179 The
Williams legacy continues to block incarcerated workers who act as
employees from bringing claims of discrimination without any
legitimate statutory foundation.180
In the last two years alone, in cases like Starry v. Oshkosh,181
Thomas v. Paul,182 and Keran v. Chambers-Smith,183 incarcerated
workers have been barred from relief for workplace discrimination
under the Williams approach despite acting as employees.184 In Starry,
the plaintiff was hired by the prison as a truck worker.185 During the
course of his work, Starry suffered knee pain and needed a replacement, initially limiting him to light-duty work and later causing his
termination.186 The department failed to meet the minimum accommodation requirements under the ADA, yet Starry could not obtain
relief because of his status as a prisoner.187 The Court denied Starry’s
claim, undeterred by other cases presuming that truck drivers outside of the prison context are employees.188 In Thomas, the plaintiff’s
supervisors in the laundry room paid him less than white inmates,
demoted him, and eventually fired him due to his race.189 Again, the
Court denied Thomas relief under the Williams approach,190 despite
other cases presuming individuals working at laundry stores are
employees.191 Finally, in Keran, the plaintiff argued he was fired
because of his age.192 Keran worked in the metal shop at the prison
for over twenty years and had received positive job evaluations from
179. See, e.g., Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., No. 03-10792-JLT, 2003 WL 26128191,
at *2 n.7 (D. Mass. July 15, 2003) (noting that prisoners are not employees), aff’d, 91 F.
App’x. 161 (4th Cir. 2004); Wilkerson v. Samuels, 524 F. App’x. 776, 779 (3d Cir. 2013);
see also Smith v. Gonzales, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31836, at *11–12 (N. D. Tex. Feb. 2,
2018) (noting that Fifth Circuit courts have followed the Williams approach).
180. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1070.
181. See Starry v. Oshkosh Corr. Inst., 731 F. App’x. 517, 517 (7th Cir. 2018).
182. See Thomas v. Paul, No. 16-CV-12-SM, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158086, at *1
(D.N.H. Sept. 12, 2019).
183. See Keran v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:20-CV-2002, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133954,
at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2020).
184. See id. at *8–9; Starry, 731 F. App’x. at *519; Thomas, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
158086, at *13–14, 17.
185. Starry, 731 F. App’x. at *518.
186. Id.
187. Id. at *517–18.
188. Id. See, e.g., Parkins v. Civil Constructors, 163 F.3d 1027, 1033–34 (7th Cir. 1998)
(assuming the employee status of the plaintiff truck driver).
189. See Thomas, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158086, at *1–2.
190. See id. at *13–14 n.4.
191. See, e.g., Odima v. Westin Tuscon Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995) (assuming that the plaintiff, who worked in a hotel laundry room, was an employee for the
purposes of Title VII).
192. See Keran v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:20-CV-2002, 2020 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 133954,
at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2020).
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his previous manager.193 A new manager took over and wanted to
purge older workers, thus firing Keran and several other older inmates.194 The ADEA denied a remedy for Keran and his co-workers
based on the Court’s adoption of Williams.195
Although less draconian than Williams, the Baker approach is
not an adequate solution.196 The Baker standard creates an arbitrary
distinction between forced labor and optional job opportunities197 that
deprives incarcerated workers who are forced to work from litigating
claims of employment discrimination.198
In cases like Castle v. Eurofresh, incarcerated workers were
prevented from suing because of the Baker approaches’ distinction
between forced labor and optional job opportunities for prisoners.199
In Castle, the plaintiff picked tomatoes for Eurofresh at a greenhouse
near his prison.200 A pre-existing ankle injury was aggravated by his
work, and Castle asked for breaks during the day to accommodate
his disability.201 He eventually requested job reassignment, but was
demoted to a lesser-paying position.202 Castle lacked recourse because he was “obligated to work at some job pursuant to a prison work
program,” and thus did not meet the Baker requirements.203 The
Baker analysis emphasized the fact that the position was paid, and
the claim in Castle involved pay discrimination based on disability,
yet the holdings differed.204
193. Id. at *6.
194. See id.
195. See id. at *7–9. Job positions in metal shops are typically given the label of
employee. See, e.g., Kalu v. Unitrack Industrial, Inc., No.92-1574 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7738, at *1–4 (D. Pa. June 4, 1992) (assuming that a former metal shop employee was
an employee under Title VII).
196. See Baker v. McNeil Island Correctional Ctr., 859 F.2d 124, 126 (9th Cir. 1988).
197. See id. The supposed distinction is based on being akin to a work release program,
where jobs that pay a salary and include some training may be considered employment
but not others. See Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984–85 (9th Cir. 1994). The forced labor
incarcerated workers are required to provide resembles regular jobs, yet it “is not
checked by many of the protections enjoyed by workers laboring in the exact same jobs on
the other side of the 20-foot barbed-wire electric fence.” See Benns, supra note 15. Furthermore, most prison jobs do include a salary and include some sort of training whether they
are forced or optional. See, e.g., Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991).
198. See, e.g., Baker, 859 F.2d at 124.
199. See, e.g., Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 2013).
200. Id. at 904. Workers for fruit growers have previously been held to be employees
under Title VII. See, e.g., United States EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 634
(9th Cir. 2019).
201. See Castle, 731 F.3d at 904.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 907 (quoting Coupar v. Dep’t of Lab., 105 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 1997)).
204. See id. at 904; see also Baker v. McNeil Island Correctional Ctr., 859 F.2d 124,
124 (9th Cir. 1988).
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These outcomes frustrate the purpose of Title VII, the ADA, and
the ADEA.205 The legislative histories of all three statutes reflect a
broad intent to implement a policy of equal opportunity in employment and create an environment free of wrongful discrimination for
all.206 It is established that employment discrimination statutes, “as
remedial legislation, [are to be] construed broadly.”207 Courts view
the purpose and language of the statutes expansively,208 but they
refuse to do so in the context of incarcerated workers.209 Discrimination “maintains the same invidious character within the world of the
prison and outside it,” and “[g]iven the broad policies behind Title
VII [and other employment discrimination protections], there would
appear to be no reason to withhold Title VII’s protections from
extending inside the prison walls.”210
This reasoning is especially true when considering the history
of prison labor and the fact that today, prison work assignments
closely resemble traditional jobs.211 Inmates consistently hold longterm jobs with regular shift schedules, and the type of work assignments performed strikingly resemble ordinary, out-of-prison jobs.212
Incarcerated employees work under the authority of supervisors,
who are either prison staff or employees for third-party corporations.213 Though not given the dignity of minimum wage, the vast
majority of inmates receive compensation for the jobs they perform.214
While the compensation is paltry, the money offers incarcerated
individuals a slice of freedom by giving them the ability to purchase
items such as food, clothing, and personal hygiene products from
205. See discussion, supra Section II.B.
206. The Supreme Court, as well as various courts of appeals and district courts, have
repeatedly stated that Title VII should be interpreted broadly. See, e.g., Lawrence D.
Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision,
39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1131 n.15 and accompanying text (2007).
207. See Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 982 (9th Cir. 1994).
208. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020) (stating that “when
Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad
rule. And that is exactly how this Court has always approached Title VII.”); see also
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992) (holding that when
interpreting employee status from the ADA, federal courts should use the broader
common law agency test as opposed to more restrictive alternatives).
209. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
210. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1992).
211. See discussion, supra Section I.D; see also discussion, supra Section I.E.
212. For a discussion of inmate work assignments that represent traditional jobs, see,
e.g., Christopher Zoukis, Inmate Work Assignments in Federal Prison, ZOUKIS CONSULTING GROUP (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.prisonerresource.com/work-assignment/in
mate-work-assignments-federal-prison [https://perma.cc/CW4S-NYPC].
213. See, e.g., Quinones v. N.Y.C., No. 19-CV-05400, 2020 WL 5665142, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2020).
214. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 100, at 483.
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commissary.215 Incarcerated workers may also receive nonmonetary
compensation for their labor, like good time credit that will allow them
an earlier release.216 Prisoners can spend up to “half of their waking
hours engaged in some form of employment[,]” which means that for
“at least half of the [time] . . . a prisoner consciously interacts with the
prison, he or she is doing so in the context of a quasi-employment relationship.”217 Although incarcerated workers may not be recognized
by the courts as employees, the actual labor that they perform paints
a different picture.218 Incarcerated workers work just as those outside of prison do.219 The main difference between incarcerated workers
and non-incarcerated “employees” are the voluntariness of the work
and the rate of compensation.220 The character of the work performed
largely retains elements of traditional jobs outside of prison.221
Additionally, inmate labor provides vast economic benefits to
the companies involved.222 Prison labor saves counties, and makes
companies, millions of dollars.223 Without the recognition of an employment relationship, inmate labor cannot be regulated to prevent
workplace discrimination.224 Why then do the courts continue to
refuse to recognize incarcerated individuals as employees under
employment discrimination statutes?225
B. Court-Created Obstacles to Recognizing Incarcerated Workers’
Rights and Why They Should Not Act as Barriers
Courts share a few major reasons why they are unwilling to
recognize incarcerated workers as employees.226 At the forefront is
prejudice against incarcerated individuals.227 One judge argued that
215. See FAQ: The Prison Commissary, PRISON FELLOWSHIP, https://www.prisonfellow
ship.org/resources/training-resources/in-prison/faq-prison-commissary [https://perma.cc
/AMK6-V4MB] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
216. See Welsh, supra note 100, at 483.
217. Leung, supra note 104, at 696.
218. See Zoukis, supra note 212.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Katherine Stevenson, Profiting off of Prison Labor, BUS.REV.BERKELEY (July 6,
2020), https://businessreview.berkeley.edu/profiting-off-of-prison-labor [https://perma.cc
/7HSE-FMXU].
223. For example, one Kentucky county estimated that inmate labor saved it approximately three million dollars during the year of 2006 alone. See Zatz, supra note 101, at 870.
At the same time, prison labor makes counties large profits. See discussion, supra Part II.
224. See, e.g., Baker v. McNeil Island Correctional Ctr., 859 F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir. 1988).
225. See, e.g., McCaslin v. Cornhusker State Indus., 952 F. Supp. 652, 656 (D. Neb.
1996).
226. See, e.g., id. at 658.
227. See id.
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an employment relationship is inapplicable in the context of prison
because the relationship between the incarcerated individual and
prison is based on the need “to control individuals who have been
unable or unwilling to control themselves.”228 But as Justice Gorsuch
wrote for the majority in Bostock v. Clayton County on the topic of
Title VII’s application to sexual orientation,
to refuse enforcement just . . . because the parties before us
happened to be unpopular at the time of the law’s passage,
would not only require us to abandon our role as interpreters of
statutes; it would tilt the scales of justice in favor of the strong
or popular and neglect the promise that all persons are entitled
to the benefit of the law’s terms.229

Courts also continually emphasize that the relationship between prisoners and prisons is not one of employer-employee but is
one of “jailor-jailed.”230 This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of employment relationships.231 Employment discrimination
statutes apply when there “is some connection with an employment
relationship.”232 The relationship between incarcerated workers and
prisons is not automatically excluded from an employment relationship simply because it initially arises out of incarceration.233 The
argument that incarceration excludes the formation of all other
relationships is simplistic.234 It fails to account for “all of the racial,
social, and economic dynamics that shape a person’s experiences”
and the “experience of being employed in prison.”235 The relationships between prisoner and prison are multifaceted and complex,
and just because the relationship arises out of incarceration does
not preclude other relationships from developing.236
228. Id.
229. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1751 (2020).
230. McCaslin, 952 F. Supp. at 657; see also Smith v. Gonzales, No. I:17-CV-0093-BL,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31836, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2018) (noting that “the primary
purpose of their association [is] incarceration, not employment”); Williams v. Meese, 926
F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (arguing that the relationship between the prisoner and
prison “arises out of his status as an inmate, not an employee”); Wilkerson v. Samuels,
524 F. App’x. 776, 779 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that similarly to the fact that inmates are
not considered employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, “Wilkerson’s relationship
with UNICOR is one of a prisoner, not an employee.”).
231. See discussion, supra Section II.B.
232. Baker v. McNeil Island Correctional Ctr., 859 F.2d 124, 127 (9th Cir. 1988).
233. See Leung, supra note 104, at 693–96.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 696.
236. See Annie McGrew & Angela Hanks, It’s Time to Stop Using Inmates for Free
Labor, TALK POVERTY (Oct. 20, 2017), https://talkpoverty.org/2017/10/20/want-prison-feel
-less-likeslaverypay-inmates-work [https://perma.cc/SWM2-Q9Q8].
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Though it is true that the relationship arises primarily out of
incarceration, the individual is still forced to enter into an employment
relationship with the prison—the existence of one relationship does
not preclude the existence of the other.237 Incarcerated workers in the
private industry make billions of dollars for companies at extremely
low costs, and incarcerated workers save counties and governments
millions every year.238 Prison labor is an inherently economic activity,
with enormous profits made off the backs of incarcerated workers.239
Prison populations were driven higher to meet the high demand for
incarcerated workers.240 These facts strongly cut against the argument that the primary purpose of the relationship is incarceration.
The inextricable linking of prison labor, racism, and mass incarceration further blurs the distinction between an employment
relationship and incarceration relationship.241 Considering the history
of prison labor, it is untenable to argue that the existence of an incarceration relationship automatically precludes the existence of an
employment relationship because incarceration relationships were
built on employment relationships.242
Another concern identified by courts is that deeming incarcerated individuals as employees under employment discrimination
statutes would entitle them to benefits such as minimum wage requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).243 Legislation
such as the FLSA and the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) also define employees as “individual[s] employed by an
employer.”244 Courts hesitate to define incarcerated workers as
employees under employment discrimination statutes for fear that
this will extend rights to incarcerated workers under other statues
like the FLSA or ERISA.245 This concern fails to be persuasive for
three separate reasons. First, as a matter of civil and labor rights,
incarcerated workers should be paid minimum wage and offered
employee benefits for their labor, especially if the goal of incarceration
is rehabilitation.246 These wages and benefits would help prepare
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 222.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See discussion, supra Part II.
242. See McGrew & Hanks, supra note 236.
243. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(1) (2018).
244. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1); Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(6) (2019).
245. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6).
246. See Josh Kovensky, It’s Time to Pay Prisoners the Minimum Wage, NEW REPUBLIC
(Aug. 15, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119083/prison-labor-equal-rights-wages
-incarcerated-help-economy [https://perma.cc/TGA3-E7ZB] (paying prisoners minimum
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incarcerated workers for a smooth transition back into their communities and provide them a sense of security, as well as allowing them
to provide for their families during their incarceration.247 Second,
even if incarcerated workers became employees under statutes like the
FLSA, Congress could impose a lowered minimum wage on incarcerated employees through legislation.248 For example, restaurant services and certain seasonal entertainment workers are exempt from
minimum wage requirements and make less than minimum wage on
an hourly basis.249 Third, defining incarcerated workers as employees
under employment discrimination statutes would not automatically
make them employees under other employment statutes like FLSA
or ERISA.250 In employment discrimination statutes, the term employee is intended to be defined broadly.251 That broad intention is
unique to employment discrimination statutes because they are
remedial in nature.252
The realities of prison labor require an analytical framework
that accounts for the employment relationship that forms between the
prison and prisoner.253 An approach that fails to do so ignores the
tangibility and profitability of the work that incarcerated individuals
wage serves rehabilitative interests by helping prisoners pay off debt and support their
families); see also McGrew & Hanks, supra note 236 (paying inmates minimum wage
assists with their transition to the community).
247. See, e.g., McGrew & Hanks, supra note 236 (explaining that paying inmates
minimum wage assists with their transition to the community); Noah Smith, Paying
Minimum Wage to Inmates Helps the Working Class, CHI. TRIB. (June 7, 2017, 8:47 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-prison-inmates-minimum-wage
-20170607-story.html (describing the payment of minimum wage to incarcerated workers
as helpful to the community at large); David C. Fathi, It’s Time to Give Prisoners a Big
Raise, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/its-time-to-give-prisoners-a-big-raise/2018/09/03/6be40364-ad5b-11e8-8a0c-70b
618c98d3c_story.html [https://perma.cc/8HYE-59RZ] (explaining the need for worker’s
compensation and other protections for incarcerated employees).
248. See Decker, supra note 170 (explaining that the Federal Government has power
to dictate prison labor policy).
249. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(I)(2)(m)(1)–(2); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(A).
250. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(I)(2)(m)(1)–(2); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
251. See Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994).
252. The remedial purposes of and broad policies behind employment discrimination
statutes have led to a uniquely broad interpretation of the definition of employee as
compared to other employment statutes. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Pub’ns, 322 U.S. 111,
124 (1944) (explaining that the term employee is not a rigid term of art but “it takes
color from its surroundings . . . [in] the statute where it appears . . . and derives meaning
from the context . . . which ‘must be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and
the end to be attained’ ”) (quoting U.S. v. Am. Truck. Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 545 (1940); S.
Chi. Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259–60 (1940)); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850
F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that a strict and narrow interpretation of
the term employee is inappropriate because of the remedial purpose of employment discrimination statutes).
253. See Leung, supra note 104, at 696.
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perform, as well as the employment relationship forced upon them.254
Prison labor “increasingly resembles civilian employment” and deserves to be recognized as such.255 The current framework fails to
account for the realities of prison labor and leaves incarcerated individuals without any form of recourse for the discrimination faced in
the prison workplace.256
IV. THE SOLUTION: REVISITING THE UNNECESSARY DISTINCTION
BETWEEN FORCED AND OPTIONAL LABOR AND THE STATUS OF
INCARCERATED WORKERS UNDER EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
The distinction between forced and optional labor is unworkable.257 The distinction inappropriately “exclude[s] those incarcerated
[from coverage by employment statutes] by classifying their working
relationship as penal, not economic[,]” in spite of the fact that prison
labor is quite similar to traditional employment.258 Incarcerated
workers typically receive compensation training, direct supervision,
and perform work similar to work done in traditional jobs.259 As
discussed earlier, prison labor takes two main forms: prison housework and goods production.260 Optional job opportunities tend to
consist of goods production and labor outside of the prison that
prisoners apply for.261 Courts tend to consider prison housework and
other mandatory employment as forced labor and thus incapable of
employment discrimination protection.262 By choosing to center
employment protection on whether the labor was forced or optional,
the courts intentionally deprive the vast majority of incarcerated
workers of their right to a workplace free of discrimination.263
254. See Becky Campbell, JCPD Women’s Prison Unique in Tennessee, JOHNSON CITY
PRESS (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.johnsoncitypress.com/jcpd-womens-prison-unique-in
-tennessee/article_ef71145c-5793-541c-8d5a-464f03179916.html [https://perma.cc/A7NG
-N3CD]; see also Garcia, supra note 104.
255. Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1061.
256. See Quinones v. N.Y.C., No. 19-CV-05400, 2020 WL 5665142, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2020); Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2013).
257. See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991).
258. Prison Labor, supra note 82; see also Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1061.
259. See discussion, supra Section III.A.
260. See FAQ: Prison Jobs, PRISON FELLOWSHIP, https://www.prisonfellowship.org/re
sources/training-resources/in-prison/faq-prison-jobs [https://perma.cc/74RL-XWN6] (last
visited Nov. 4, 2021).
261. See id.; see also Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76633, at *3–4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2008) (describing the labor opportunities at the jail
that housed Johnson).
262. See, e.g., Quinones v. N.Y.C., No. 19-CV-05400, 2020 WL 5665142, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2020); Castle, 731 F.3d at 907.
263. See, e.g., Quinones, 2020 WL 5665142, at *7; Castle, 731 F.3d at 907.
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When examining the history of prison labor, it is clear that the
government intended to, and does, benefit greatly from the carceral
state, creating an entire economy off the backs of the incarcerated
for their own profit.264 In this context, it makes little sense to draw
a distinction between the work being performed and its optionality
when all labor performed is intended to benefit the carceral state.
The Supreme Court has never, and should never, endorse the Circuit Court’s view that different standards apply to forced and optional labor.265 Instead, courts should focus on obtaining protection
for all workers.
Furthermore, whether labor is forced or not, incarcerated work
should be recognized as an employment relationship. As discussed
earlier, four tests currently exist to determine employee status in
the employment discrimination context: the common law approach,
the primary purpose approach, the economic realities approach, and
the hybrid approach.266 Under all four tests, incarcerated workers
should be considered employees, regardless of whether their labor
is forced or optional, although this has not been the case.267
For example, take the case of Alfretta Johnson.268 Ms. Johnson
is a white woman who was incarcerated in Tennessee.269 The
Sullivan County Jail operated an inmate work program at a different
jail from where Johnson was held.270 To participate in the Johnson
City Jail–Women’s Work Camp program, an inmate has to apply for
“trusty” status.271 Only inmates who meet certain criteria can apply
to participate in the program.272 Johnson applied to the program, as
she met the criteria and worked in the program during her previous
stays.273 Johnson’s application was denied, and she was told not to
reapply.274 Johnson continued to follow up on her application, but
264. See Campbell, supra note 254.
265. The Supreme Court has instead adopted the common law “right to control” test
to define employee status. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538
U.S. 440, 448 (2003).
266. The primary purpose approach has been criticized for its ambiguity and courts’
inability to apply the test consistently. See Carlson, supra note 128, at 300.
267. See, e.g., Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991); Castle, 731 F.3d
at 910.
268. See Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *1
(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2008).
269. See id. at *2.
270. See id. at *3.
271. Id. at *3–4.
272. Id. Additionally, inmates can request a transfer to where the program is being
held. Id.
273. See Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *4.
274. Id.
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had extreme difficulty obtaining a response.275 She never transferred to work at the program.276 Johnson finally discovered that the
supervising officer denied her “trusty” status because she was
dating a Black man.277 Johnson filed suit as the victim of associational discrimination under Title VII.278 Johnson was ultimately
barred from any recovery due to her lack of employee status and,
even if her employee status was assumed, the Court determined
that she was never engaged in any activity that would be protected by
Title VII.279
Women at the work camp Johnson applied for usually work on
a work crew outside the jail or at a job assignment inside the facility.280 Job assignments inside the jail “include laundry and kitchen
duty while jobs outside the jail include custodial work in city buildings, mowing city property, litter pick-up and washing or detailing city
vehicles.”281 The type of work performed by the prisoner is dictated
by the nature of their crime.282 Incarcerated workers at the camp receive three days of good-time credit for each day of work performed.283
The jail benefits from free labor and Johnson City makes money “as
long as the beds remain full.”284
Under the primary purpose approach, Johnson’s potential employment should establish employee status.285 The primary purpose
test looks to the legislative intent of the statute to determine employment status.286 Under the broad goals of employment discrimination statutes and examining the labor performed by the women’s
work camps, the women would surely qualify as employees.287 Even
when applying the primary purpose approach like that in Williams,
although the primary purpose of the relationship may be incarceration, an employment relationship still exists as well.288 Under the common law approach, again, Johnson should come out as an employee.289
The common law approach, as discussed earlier, emphasizes the right
275.
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Id.
Id. at *4–5.
See id. at *9.
See Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *13–14.
See Campbell, supra note 254.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion of legislative intent, supra Section III.A.
See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1064.
See discussion of legislative intent, supra Section III.A.
See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991).
See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003).
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to control.290 Here, the work program would have the absolute right to
control Johnson.291 The program gets to select inmates for the program
and then assign them to the position that the program chooses.292 If
inmates are assigned to work outside of the jail, the program trains a
direct supervisor and defines the scope of their work.293 The jail sets
the hours of work for all work.294 All of this points to a traditional
employment relationship.295 Other factors in the common law analysis
point towards an employment relationship as well: the employer provides all supplies in the workplace, there is a form of payment through
the good time credit earned, the work is part of the regular business
of the prison, and the prisoner solely works for the program.296 Taken
together, Johnson should be seen as an employee under employment
discrimination statutes using the common law approach.297
The economic reality is also that Johnson should be an employee
under employment discrimination statutes.298 The economic reality
approach inquires whether, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is economically dependent on the employer or is in business
for themself.299 In this inquiry, financial considerations of the employer
and employee are “paramount.”300 Here, Johnson is completely dependent on the employer.301 Although the work program does not offer
Johnson a salary, it offers her compensation in the form of good time
credit.302 She has no other alternative avenue to earn any form of compensation.303 Additionally, the economic reality is that the inmate
workforce makes the work camp an exorbitant amount of money.304
Not only does the city save immense labor costs both inside and outside the jail from prison labor; the jail brought in over $200,000.00
290. See discussion of common law factors, supra Section II.A.
291. See Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *4–8
(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2008).
292. See id.
293. See Campbell, supra note 254.
294. See id.
295. See O’Callaghan, supra note 135, at 1194–95.
296. See id.; Campbell, supra note 254.
297. See O’Callaghan, supra note 135, at 1194–95; Campbell, supra note 254; Johnson
v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *4–5 (E.D. Tenn.
Aug. 28, 2008).
298. See Lebowitz, supra note 134.
299. See discussion of economic reality test, supra Section II.A.
300. See Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, The Prism of Entrepreneurship: Creating a New
Lens for Worker Classification, 70 BAYLOR L. REV. 596, 611 (2018).
301. See Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *4–8; see also Campbell, supra note
254 (describing the relationship between incarcerated persons and the jail).
302. See Campbell, supra note 254.
303. See Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *4–6.
304. See Campbell, supra note 254.
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in profit per year.305 Based on Johnson’s lack of other employment opportunities and the financial relationship created with prison institution, Johnson should be considered an employee as a matter of
economic reality.306
Finally, Johnson would also have been considered an employee
under the hybrid approach.307 The hybrid approach, as discussed
earlier, examines both the economic reality of the relationship as
well as the right to control.308 The right to control, as in the common
law test, surely weighs in favor of Johnson and other incarcerated
workers being considered employees; the prison has total control
over the work and the way it is performed.309 Additionally, the economic reality is that the incarcerated worker is dependent on the
prison employer to make a living while incarcerated.310 Johnson should
be granted employee status under the hybrid approach as well.
Johnson is just one of the millions of incarcerated workers at
risk of employment discrimination.311 Her story serves as an example of how courts have improperly interpreted employment discrimination statutes to leave incarcerated workers at the mercy of the
prisons incarcerating them despite the statutes’ true applicability
to the situation.312
CONCLUSION
Incarcerated workers play a significant, but largely invisible
and silent, role in our economy today. Yet courts have consistently
held that incarcerated workers lack standing as employees to bring
suit under employment discrimination statutes like Title VII, the
ADA, and the ADEA. Considering the realities of prison labor and
the context of the work performed by incarcerated individuals,
including the power and profit generated by prisons and private
companies, employment discrimination statutes should be expanded
to encapsulate all labor required of prisoners. This expansion would
protect incarcerated workers from further marginalization and
305. See id.
306. See Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *4–8; Campbell, supra note 254;
see, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 322, 323–24 (1992) (holding that
when interpreting employee status from the ADA, federal courts should use the broader
common law agency test as opposed to more restrictive alternatives).
307. See Kirklin, supra note 26, at 1065–67.
308. See discussion of the hybrid test, supra Section II.A.
309. See Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *4–5.
310. See id. at *4–6.
311. See Benns, supra note 15.
312. See Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76633, at *14; see, e.g., Moyo v. Gomez, 40
F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994).
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discrimination at the hands of the prisons. Incarcerated workers like
Anibal Quinones and Alfretta Johnson, at the very least, deserve to be
protected by the courts from discrimination in the workplace as
millions of other Americans, doing the same job on the other side of
the fence, are every day.
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